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ABSTRACT, Conventional analysis of public goods
provision aggregates individual wiltitigne.ss to pay
while treatitig income as exogenous, ignoring the fact
that we generate income to allow us to purclia.se
utility-generating goods. We explore the implica-
tiotis of endogenizing the lahorlleisure decision hy
explicitly considering leisure detnami in a model of
public goods provision. We consider benefit analysis
of public goods provision atul JÍtul that increments of
the public good will generally be under-valued using
conventiotial attaly.sis while decrctncnts to the public
good (rare in public good settings) will be overval-
ued (JELC91,D61,Q5I)
I. INTRODUCTION
The public goods provision problem is
undoubtedly one of the most celebrated
economic problems. Samuelson (1954) pre-
sented us with an elegant characterization
of a socially optimal provision of private
and public goods. In his seminal paper
Samuelson wrote "provided economic
quantities can be divided into two groups.
( 1 ) outputs or goods which everyone wants
to maximize; and (2) inputs or factors which
everyone wants to minimize, we are free to
change the algebraic signs of the latter
category and from then on work only with
•goods,' knowing that the case of factor
inputs is covered as well." According to
Samuelson's analysis, time available for
leisure and labor is simply another scarce
commodity. Like Robinson Crusoe's com,
time can be eaten, that is, consumed, or put
lo productive use.
While Samuelson's analysis is sufficiently
general to handle the optimal allocation of
time in the context of public and private
goods, subsequent attempts to implement
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Samuelson's ideal through economic wel-
fare analysis fail to consider the joint
consumptive and productive aspects of
time. Income earned comes at an opportu-
nity cost of less time spent with family and/
or less time pursuing activities that detract
from earned income. Welfare economics
simply views a higher income as better than
a lower income without regard to the
additional sweat and toil needed to obtain
this higher income.' Separating the analysis
of public goods (as well as changes in
market prices) from the act of income
generation has firm practical roots. The
welfare analyst rarely, if ever, obtains data
that is rich enough to model preferences for
public goods, private goods, and personal
time allocation. Cross-sectional data pro-
vides income variation without any regard
to the relative sacrifice to obtain the income
variation seen in those data. Given data
limitations and the fact that welfare eco-
nomics is essentially an applied science, it is
no surprise that welfare economics treats
income as a given. Thus while Samuelson's
analysis may view time as just another
commodity, the practice of welfare eco-
nomics, where the rubber meets the road in
the analysis o^ public goods, fails even to
treat time as a scare economic quantity.
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As economists love to point out, there is
no such thing as a free lunch, and this
phrase applies to the welfare analysis of
public goods. As we demonstrate below,
failure to recognize the dual consumptive
and productive aspects of time leads to a
biased analysis of public goods. Because
people work to buy the things they desire,
the problem is not simply that of failing to
identify the correct level of public goods.
Failure to find the correct level of public
goods implies failure to fmd the correct
level of income as well. Thus, the output
failure associated with free riding is accom-
panied by an input failure in the labor
market." Though practical data limitations
may always confound an ideal analysis of
public goods, the implications of falling
short of this ideal are nonetheless impor-
tant.
11. BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND INPUT
MARKET DECISIONS
Standard welfare analysis for valuing a
change in a quantity-rationed public good
typically treats income as being given at
initial fixed levels. This implicitly assumes
that leisure demanded/labor supplied, is
constrained to the status quo level and that
the status quo level of income is the optimal
level. The LeChatelier-Samuelson Principle
implies that if we constrain a person to the
same level of leisure, then the gain in utility
for an increase in the public good will be less
than if we allow for adjustment in leisure."^
The compensating surplus/willingness to
pay for the increase under constrained
leisure choices is shown here to be less than
willingness to pay under a regime of free
choice of leisure. Similarly for a reduction in
the public good, willingness to accept
compensation will also be greater than if
we had allowed for leisure adjustment. This
^ Free riding in inpul markets is discussed further in
Graves (2004). Here we pursue the theoretical implica-
tions of failure to endogenize tbe labor/leisure decision.
' As discussed in Graves (2004). this problem is
exacerbated when the initial level of leisure is itself non-
optimal due to what Graves refers to as the input market
failure,
second case is seldom of relevance in
practical policy settings where improve-
ments in, for example, air or water quality
are being considered.
Our general model is very similar to
standard models of public goods provision.
A representative consumer's preferences are
defined over a vector of market goods. X, a
public good, c/. but now we add leisure, L.
Though we use a representative agent in
developing our analytical points, it is not
critical that everyone have identical prefer-
ences. We focus on a representative con-
sumer because our obsei^ations need only
be discussed in the context of a single
individual; the main points carry directly
over to multiple consumers with a wide
variety of preferences for public and other
goods. While our model is similar in spirit
to the typical public goods analysis, the
addition of leisure differs from the standard
analysis. It is assumed that all goods are
normal goods. The primal problem is to
maximize utility by choosing levels of
market goods X and leisure /, in a single
period subject to the budget constraint p-\
+ T •q + wL ^ wH. and a rationed level of
the public good t¡ = í/". H is total time
available and r is the individual tax rate for
providing the public good. The formal
problem is stated as follows.
Max [/(X. q, L) in X. L subject to
p-\ + vq + wL = wH,q - Í/". [1]
The ordinary demands for market goods
will depend on prices, the wage rate, the
tax rate for the public good, and the level
of the public good. A"" = X"'{p, u', T, q\
L"'(p, w, z, q).^ While these ordinary
demands dictate the observable behavior,
they do not provide the proper insights into
the monetary measures used in welfare
analysis. In order to develop proper welfare
measures, we consider the dual problem of
minimizing expenditures on market goods
and leisure subject to the level of q and the
level of utility,
•* Tbe m superscript refers to ordinary, Marshallian
solutions.
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Min/ïX -H Tí/ -I- w-L in X. L. subject to
U{X.q,L) = ü\i, = cl'\ [2]
The solutions to the dual problem depend
on prices, the wage rate, the lax rate on
the public good, the level of the public
good, and the level of utility, X'' = X*'
{p,w, T, q, U), L'' = L''{p. w, T, q, U).'
Using the demands, we can easily represent
the amount of wealth adjustment that
would leave our consumer indifferent be-
tween obtaining an increase in the public
good from an initial level cf to a new. higher
level i/'. As in standard welfare analysis that
treats income as exogenous, the wealth
adjustment that makes the consumer indif-
ferent is referred to as compensating sur-
plus*" and is equal to the diflerencc in the
minimized expenditures.
CS = p-[X"{p, w, r, q\ i/") - X''{p, w. T. qK Í/')]
+ H-lL^ip. H: r.i/\ Í/") - ¿''(/;, n; r. y'. t/")]
+ r [ / - , ' j , [3]
In order to contrast [3] with a standard
welfare analysis that treats leisure demand
as fixed, we constrain the choice of our
consumer while providing the same increase
in the public good. The minimization
problem will be identical to the problem in
[2], with the exception that leisure is
constrained to the status quo level of
leisure, which we will refer to as ¿". Now
the only choice variables in the expenditure
miniinization problem are the levels of the
market goods, X. Given the constraint we
alter our notation to reflect this constraint.
XS = Xiip, If. L", T. Í/, U\ letting the " S "
subscript refer to the "standard" notion of
compensated demand where leisure is fixed.
With our new notation, we can express the
* The h superscript refers to the solution to the dual
problem, the compensated or Hicksian demands.
Hicks 1943. p. .17, develops four consumer's sur-
pluses, price compcnsaling variation, quantity compen-
sating variaiioii. price equivalent Variation, and quantity
equivalent variation. Following Freeman (1993). we use
the term compensating surplus instead of quantity
compensating variation.
Standard notion of compensating surplus
found in the welfare economics literature,
CSs =p-[X',{p,n'.L',T,q\U'')
As our intuition suggests, the relationship
between the standard compensating surplus
[4] and compensating surplus with Hexible
leisure demand [3] is easy to establish.
PROPOSITION 1: For an increa.se in the
public ^ oodfrom t/" lo a new higher level q\ it
will generally be true that CSs ^  CS.
Furthermore, CSs < CS. except when the
incotne effect of compensated leisure de-
manded exactly equals the siibstitulion effeet
of compensated leisure demand from a
change in q.
PROOF, PART 1: The first statement in
Proposition I is very easy to establish. First
note that by definition/Í-A^' {p, w, T, Í/', t/")
+ W-L'XP, W, T, ?", i/*^ ) -H T q^= p-Xs\p. w,
¿", T, q'\ V ") + w L" + T4\ that is initial
expenditures are equal for both problems.
Given the respective minimization prob-
lems that provide the demands in [.3] and [4],
we know that it must be the case that
; T, q\ lP) + wL" (/7, w, T, Í/', t/")
+ Ti/'< /7-.ri(/7, H'. ¿". T, q\ U") + W ¿'V Tí/'.
The facts that initial expenditures are equal
and -[p-X¡(p, H, L ,^ T, q\l/) + w L"+ r q']
< ~[p-Ap^ vv, T, q\ C/") -t- W-L'' (p, w, T,
q\ U ") + Tí/'] leads to the consequent CSs
< CS.
PROOI. PART 2: Part 1 of the proof
establishes the weak inequality. To prove
the second statement, we need only estab-
lish the conditions under which CSs = CS.
CSs - CS when L''[ p, w, T. Í/\ Í / ) = L''{ /?,
M', T, g , í-^ *), that is. when compensated
leisure demand does not respond to the
change in q. Compensated leisure demand
from minimizalion problem [4] will differ
from ordinary leisure demand in problem
[1], once q is changed from the initial level.
The two diverge, since as q is increased,
wealth must be decreased in the compen-
sated case. There wiJl be an income etlect if
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leisure responds to changes in wealth,
regardless of whether leisure is a normal
good, that is, increases with wealth, or an
inferior good in the same sense. In the case
of wealth-sensitive leisure, demand of either
form (normal or inferior). L''(p, \\\ i, if,
U^) = L\P, W, T, q\ U^) only when the sub-
stitution effect exactly cancels out the efTect
of the reduction in income for the compen-
sated demands.^ In the case where leisure
demand is independent of wealth, then L''{p,
w, X, Í/", f/') - L!'{}\ It', T, Í/'. (/") only when
there is no substitution effect. Both of these
cases are the razor's edge, particularly the
case where leisure demand is sensitive to
wealth effects.
Willingness to accept compensation for a
reduction in the public good is a particular
case of compensating surplus. The initial
level of the public good is the higher level
and the initial utility level is the higher
utility. For the decrease, standard compen-
sating surplus is still less than compensating
surplus. However these surpluses are both
negative and so for reductions, ignoring
iticome adjustments results in interring that
more compensation is required than is
actually necessary. The intuition is easy to
grasp. If leisure is flexible, less compensa-
tion is required to keep utility at the higher
level when the public good is reduced, than
when leisure is fixed. The general results on
compensating surplus make intuitive sense.
When leisure is flexible, a person will obtain
maximum value for increases in the public
good, relative to leisure fixed, and be willing
to pay more. For decreases in the public
good, flexibility dampens the blow and so
less compensation is required. In either
case, treating income as ftxed results in
measurement errors. In the United States,
the analysis of natural resource damages
and federal environmental policy relies on a
willingness-to-pay approach, even in cases
in which willingness to accept is the more
appropriate concept. The justification for
^ This condition is similar to the weak complemen-
tarity condition (Maler 1974) that requires no changes in
compensated demands for a change in public goods after
a certain price for the weakly complementary good is
reached.
this policy is that it resuhs in a more
conservative approach to benefits assess-
ment. Thus according to our analysis, the
bulk of environmental policy analysis will
result in a tendency to generally under-
provide these public goods.
Analyzing the impact of assuming a fixed
leisure demand/labor supply creates greater
difficulties for equivalent variation. In the
case of equivalent variation, a fixed income
approach assumes that earned income after
the change in the public good equals earned
income before the change. When this
assumption is violated, a fixed income
approach infers the wrong earned income
after the change takes place and infers the
wrong income necessary to maintain the
post-change utility level. Under a fixed-
income approach, equivalent variation is
essentially the difference between two in-
correct money measures.
Further implications for welfare analysis
flow from the fact that our analysis directly
extends to price changes. A fixed-income
approach will understate the welfare bene-
fits of lower prices and overstate the welfare
losses of higher prices when using compen-
sating variation as the welfare measure.
Thus our results really apply to welfare
economics in general. It may be the case
that changes in public goods may be
implemented through pollution taxes in-
stead of lump sum taxes as suggested in our
model. Given the immediate extension of
our results to price changes, our model
readily handles this general class of prob-
lems. Simply set the direct tax rate to zero
and simultaneously implement price chang-
es with changes in public goods and we
arrive at the analysis of pollution taxes.
III. POLICY RELEVANCE
While not critical to our point, it is useful
to consider the historical pattern of public
good provision, for specificity air quality
provision. There will be, on the basis of
prior actions, some initial level of air
quality, oo in Figure 1. MBTRCH depicts
the true marginal value of the public good,
when labor is allowed to vary optimally
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FIGURE 1
TRUE VERSUS APPARENT OPTIMAL PtiBLic GOOD PROVISION LEVEL
with public good provision, as discussed
above. MB¡,, represents the marginal will-
ingness-to-pay for the public good when the
leisure is fixed at L,,, presuming for
simplicity of argument that the well-known
demand revelation problems have been
solved. L,, is also assumed, optimistically,
to be the optimal level of leisure for the
initial level of public goods provision, QQ.^
MC in Figure 1 represents the marginal
provision cost of providing air qtiality,
perhaps taking the form of higher prices
lor private goods in the case of air quality or
higher tax payments for the case of
municipal water treatment plants. Clearly.
Q** is the provision level ofthe public good
that is socially optimal (the "optimum
optimorum"). but that provision level
would not be realized by a marginal analysis
that relies on Mß/„. Rather, even in this
idealized world of perfect demand revela-
tion. Q[* would be selected by the regula-
tory authority, since they are evaluating the
increment out of current income, not the
income that would be generated at the
higher public goods provision level.
It is true that, having provided Qi*, there
would be a new marginal willingness-to-pay
curve associated with the reduced leisure
Graves (2004) argues that the initial leisure chosen
would be expected to be non-optimally large.
(hence greater income) that would ensue at
the new provision level. This is shown as the
dashed line in Figure I. Were another
benefit-cost analysis to be conducted, an
increased level of provision would be seen
as optimal. This process could, in principle,
converge over time to the true optimum.
Q**. However, benefit-cost analysis is
costly and only sporadically conducted.
Moreover, the true marginal wiliingness-
to-pay curve is itself shifting outward over
time with rising real incomes.'* making it
diíTicult to discern whether the gap between
actual provision and optimal provision is
narrowing or widening despite increased
provision levels.
In response to an anonymous reviewer's
concern, we would like to address the
interesting question of whether respondents
actually endogenize potential labor supply
responses in their stated-preferences. If they
do, policy analysts will perceive accurate
information from which to make environ-
mental decisions. Moreover, it is clear that
the hedonic method will not generally be
'' Conventional empirical analyses of Ihe relationship
between willingness lo pay and individuals' (flxedt
incomes generally Hnd a positive relalionship. but the
income elasticity of willingness to pay is Trequentíy less
than one (McFadden 1994). This po;iitivc relationship is
all thai is needed for the true marginal wlUingncss-to-pay
curve to shin out as real income rises.
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subject to the endogeneity problem empha-
sized here, because that approach to valuing
environmental amenities essentially con-
verts a spatially varying public good into a
private good, bundled with land. We would
be expected to properly generate income to
buy the things that can be individually
purchased via income generation.
But the concern of the reviewer is of
considerable interest, prompting both the-
oretical and empirical exploration. One
would expect that the "sum of specific
damages" approach (sometimes called the
"health effects" model) to valuing environ-
mental damages would ignore the valuation
problem emphasized here. This method is
widely applied, and would result in under-
valuation, implicitly holding leisure con-
stant when optimal leisure would decline.
The case of constructed markets, em-
ploying contingent valuation or conjoint
analysis, is not so straight-forward, since we
do not know whether respondents think
about possible changes in income when
asked to value a good. To address this issue,
one of the authors conducted a classroom
survey to explore the possibility that re-
spondents subconsciously endogenize,
whether analysts consider that or not. To
control for various forms of spurious
correlation, two questionnaires were ad-
ministered to university students, splitting
the class, with half receiving one question-
naire and half the other. One of the
questionnaires involved a "quasi-public"'
good (bike paths and hiking trails that
could at least potentially be used by
students) and one related to a pure public
good (open space purchases for preserva-
tion and sprawl limitation).
In both cases, after asking for initial
valuations--along with many traditional
socio-detnographic questions—a last ques-
tion was added. That question was "most
people decide on how much to contribute
based on their current income, recognizing
that the more they give to the fund the
'" The values to be attached to the physical effects are
determined from current incomes, not tbe incomes that
would be generated in a general equilibrium context.
fewer other goods they can cotisume.
However, the possibility of contributing
to the fund might also cause people to want
to change the number of hours they work,
increasing their income. By increasing their
income, any contribution could be made
without giving up as many other goods.
Thinking explicitly about this possibility,
would you work more to increase your
income?""
For present purposes, a theoretical pre-
diction is clear. The more "pure" the public
good, the more likely it is that individuals
would attempt to both "free ride" in the
traditional sense, but also fail to think
about endogenous changes in their work/
leisure decisions. The results of the survey
suggest that the concerns of the present
paper (and those of Graves 2004), might
well be of empirical importance. When the
"quasi-private" good was being considered,
those surveyed expressed greater willingness
to pay initially, as expected. But when the
potential of working more hours to gener-
ate more income was raised, aggregate
values rose by 33'!^ ..
As expected from the analysis presented
here (and from traditional free rider theo-
ry), the initial valuations were smaller-
about lO'Yo smaller in this specific case—
when the valuation elicited was for the pure
public good. But, again as expected, when
the potential for working more was raised,
the additional expressed willingness to pay
rose by 67"/), much larger than for the quasi-
private good. While we would not like to
place undue emphasis on the quantitative
results of these initial empirical inquiries,
the qualitative results are consistent with
the arguments presented here.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We argue that failure to endogenize the
labor/leisure decision—conducting benefit-
" The full questionnaires and detailed results are
available from the authors. Seven of 28 respondents
elected to increase Iheir contribution amounts for the
pure public good while eight of 25 students increased iheir
contributions lor the quasi-public good.
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cost analysis at current income levels—
generally results in undervaluation for
increments to a public good. Intuitively,
this follows from the fact thai the cost of the
public good increment will result in a higher
marginal valuation of ordinary private
goods as their quantities are reduced to
pay for the public good, and this in turn will
result in a higher marginal cost of leisure.
We will work more at higher public good
provision levels, hence will generate a
higher income, and this effect is not
considered, a priori.''
One might initially suspect that endogeniz-
ing leisure would merely result in second-
order elïects that would be negligible around
the true optimum. This would be true if we
were likely to be anywhere near the true
optimum. ^ But with costly bcnefil-cost
analyses conducted only infrequently, and
with the true marginal benefits themselves
shifting out over time with rising real income,
we are unlikely to be near the true optimum,
as depicted in Figure I. The effects discussed
here could result in substantial real-world
under provision of public goods.
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